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ABSTRACT
The literature on tax evasion and its implication for optimal tax theory has concentrated on
income tax evasion. The issue of commodity tax evasion has received relatively little
attention even though it is important in many cases, especially in developing countries.
This paper proposes a theory of marginal reform of indirect taxes that recognises the
presence of commodity tax evasion. Illustrative evidence from Indian data confirm the
sensitivity of the Pareto improving direction of marginal tax changes to alternative a priori
assumptions on commodity tax evasion. The theory of marginal reform of commodity
taxes is, then, extended to propose a theory of marginal reform of audits and penalties,
and several propositions are derived. The underlying theory of tax design is also extended
to include income tax design and income tax evasion, and a framework is proposed to
allow the simultaneous analyses of both forms of tax evasion, and study of their impact on
the "optimal mix" of direct and indirect taxes.3
1. INTRODUCTION
The literature on tax evasion and its implications for optimal tax theory, pioneered
independently by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973), has, until
recently, concentrated almost exclusively on income rather than commodity taxes
[see Cowell (1990) for a survey]. The problem of commodity tax evasion has
received relatively little attention. Exceptions include Marrelli (1984), Schweizer
(1984), Usher (1986), Virmani (1989), Kaplow (1990), Cremer and Gahvari (1992,
1993), and Kesselman (1993). Since in developing countries, e.g. India, indirect taxes
play a much larger role than direct taxes, analysis of commodity tax evasion is of
greater importance for these economies. To my knowledge, there is hardly any study
on the extent of commodity tax evasion in LDCs but, if the evidence on China
presented recently by Shu (1992) is any indication, then the issue of commodity tax
evasion and its implication for tax policy is a substantive one, and deserves greater
attention than it has received in the literature to date.
The limited literature on commodity tax evasion, referred to above, has mostly
focussed attention on the production side of the economy. The papers by Schweizer
(1984) and Cremer and Gahvari (1992, 1993) are among the very few to examine the
welfare aspects of commodity tax evasion from the viewpoint of consumption. The
present study is motivated by an attempt to present a theory of marginal commodity
tax reforms that recognises the presence of tax evasion. We present illustrative Indian
empirical evidence that confirms sensitivity of Pareto improving tax changes to the
presence and extent of commodity tax evasion. Although the emphasis in this paper
is on tax reform rather than tax design, the paper shows later that the elegant model
of optimal commodity taxation under tax evasion, due to Cremer and Gahvari (1993),
can be extended to include the case of income tax evasion. We, thus, provide an
alternative to the expected utility maximization approach that has characterised much
of the income tax evasion literature [see, for example, Sandmo (1981) and, recently,
Lemieux, et. al. (1994)].4
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the theory of marginal tax
reforms, due to Ahmad and Stern (1984), to allow for commodity tax evasion, and
extends the principle of Pareto improving tax changes to propose a theory of
"marginal audit reforms". Section 3 provides illustrative empirical evidence for India
that confirm sensitivity of direction of welfare improving tax changes to tax evasion.
This section also contains evidence on the sensitivity of marginal tax reforms to
alternative demand systems. The next two sections contain extensions of the optimal
commodity tax/tax evasion model. Section 4 introduces a very simple model of fiscal
federalism that allows commodity tax, audit probability and penalty for evasion to
vary between regions. Section 5 extends the model to allow simultaneous treatment
of commodity and income tax evasion. The paper ends on the concluding note of
Section 6.5
2. THEORY OF COMMODITY TAX AND AUDIT REFORMS UNDER TAX
EVASION
We consider a competitive economy consisting of n industries producing n different
commodities. The production technologies are assumed linear, and ci is the constant
marginal and average cost of good i. Let p, q, denote (n x 1) vectors of consumer ˜ t
prices, producer prices and nominal commodity taxes. Let A and u represent the n x
n fixed input - output coefficients matrix and the n x 1 vector of inputs in the
production of various commodities, respectively. If the commodity taxes are specific,
we have
p=q+ ( 1 ) ˜ t
The competitive pricing conditions with commodity taxes are
q¢ =w u ¢+p ¢ A (2)
where w is the wage rate. Substituting (1) into (2), we have
p¢ =w u ¢( I-A )




p=c+t ( 3 )
where c is the n x 1 vector of average costs, and t¢ = ( I-A )
-1 is the (1 x n) row ˜ t
¢
vector of effective taxes (ti) as in Ahmad and Stern (1984). The government revenue
constraint with commodity taxes alone is given as follows:
Y = R or, t¢ X=R ( 4 ) ˜ t
¢6
where Y, X represent (n x 1) vectors of gross output and final demands of
commodities, respectively. Since in a static Leontief model, Y = (I - A)
-1 X, we have
the following relation between nominal and effective commodity taxes:
Y=t ¢X ˜ t
¢
In this section, expenditure and labour supply decisions are assumed separable, and
direct taxation is ruled out. Let v
h (p,µ
h) denote individual h’s (h = 1,.,H) indirect
utility function where x
h denotes his vector of commodity demand, and µ
h =p ¢ x
hhis
aggregate expenditure. Note that, since we are ignoring savings, the terms "income"
and "expenditure" will be used synonymously in this paper. Let us define social
welfare W over the individuals’ indirect utilities, so that it is specified as a function
of prices.







If X(p) denotes the aggregate demand vector, then













where Ro is set exogenously by the authorities. Let us now introduce tax evasion into
the model. Following Cremer and Gahvari (1993), let denote the proportion of ai
sales reported in industryi-i nother words, is the proportion of ai ( 1 ai)
actual sales evaded. We assume 0 < < 1 to avoid the possibility of corner ai
solutions - see Cremer and Gahvari (1992) for an analysis of the case where a can
be 0 or 1. Let Gi (a
*), which is increasing and convex in a
*, be the firm’s resource7
cost of evading unit of output, so that gi (a
*)=a
*
i G i( a
* ) is the cost of concealment
per unit of output. The tax authorities audit a fraction of firms, bi (0 £b i£1). Firms
caught cheating pay a fine t proportional to the amount evaded. We initially assume
the fine to be invariant across industries but relax it later.




i ={ p i-c i-g i ( a
* ) - [(1 - bi) ai ti + bi (ti +( t-1 )( 1-a i )t i )]}
=p i-c i-g i( a
* )-( a i+a
*
i b it )t i (8)





ib it )t i (9)
The first and second order conditions for an optimal a
*
i are given by
g¢ i (a
*










i denote the first and second derivatives of gi with respect to a
*
i. (9a)
implies that a necessary condition for interior solution, assumed to hold in this paper,
is bi t < 1. An economic rationale for this condition is as follows:
Expected gain from tax evasion per unit of sales
=t i-( a i+ b it )t i=( 1-a i )( 1-b it )t i (10) ai8
Hence, (1 - bi t) is the expected gain from tax evasion as a proportion of the sales
evaded. We, thus, require bi t < 1 to ensure an incentive for tax evasion. In the




i =( a i+a
*
i b it )t idenote the "expected" tax payment per unit of output. Let
the government’s audit cost be denoted by d(b) which is an increasing function of
the audit probabilities, b.
Tax evasion requires equations (3), (7) to be modified as follows:
p=c+g+t
e (11)
where both g and t
e,e a c hanx1vector of gi, respectively, are evaluated at the t
e
i





i Xi d( b )
If (i = 1,.,n) denotes the marginal social cost of raising an extra unit of revenue l
t
i













with higher and raising taxes on others - in other words, the scope for welfare l
t
i s
improving tax changes exists until the l
t
i s are all equal, which characterises the state
where commodity taxes are optimal. The first order conditions for optimal























h is the welfare weight of household h, and eji is the uncompensated price9
elasticity of demand for j with respect to the price of item i. Note from (10) and (11)









formulation [see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)].



















where Î³0 denotes "inequality aversion". Normalising w
h = 1 for the poorest








1 is the aggregate expenditure of the poorest individual.
















































































(ai ai bi t) (1 bi t)t i
¶ai
¶ti
From the first order condition for optimal ai







Substituting (22) into (20), (21), and the resulting expressions into the denominator



































(ak ak bkt)e ki tk Ek
where Ek =p kX kis aggregate expenditure on k, t
*
k = is the tax rate, and eki is the
tk
pk
uncompensated price elasticity of k with respect to i.
Now, given the estimates of demand systems, income distributional weights (w
h), the
observed vectors of commodity demand, the tax rates and the magnitude of tax
evasion represented by the vector a, we can compute the vector of marginal social
costs, l
t
i, from (24). The ranking of the l
t
i s indicates the direction of welfare
improving marginal tax reforms. This raises the issue of sensitivity of the l
t
i rankings
to (a) the estimated demand system used in calculating the price elasticities (eki), and
(b) the estimate of tax evasion, ak. Since neither of these behaviourial magnitudes is
observed but have to be estimated or assumed, the sensitivity issue is of considerable
policy significance. We present some illustrative evidence on Indian expenditure data
in the next section.
If there is no "inequality aversion" (Î = 0), and the tax rates are uniform (t
*
i = ø),











where = ak + a
*




j , and hence uniform ˜ ak
tax rates will not be optimal in this case. This marks an important departure from the
conventional case of no tax evasion (Ai = 1, = 1 for all k) and can be stated as ˜ ak
the following proposition.
Proposition 1:
In the presence of commodity tax evasion, uniform tax rates will not generally be
optimal even for a utilitarian (Î = 0) tax authority.
Equations (23a), (25) also tell us that for Î =0 ,l i
t , will be the same across
commodities if bi, ai and the gi (.) function are commodity invariant. Alternatively,
(24) implies that if there is no cost of sales concealment, i.e. gi = 0, so that Ai =1 ,





If tax evasion , resource cost of evading unit of output (gi), and audit probability (ai)
(bi) are the same for all commodities, then a utilitarian tax authority will find the
uniform tax rate to be optimal.
Proposition 3:
If there is no resource cost of evasion, and the tax authority is utilitarian, then the
"generalized tax rates", will be uniform. ˜ ai ti
, which is the ratio of "expected" tax rate (t
*
i
e) to actual tax rate (t
*
i) is only partly ˜ ai
determined by the government’s action (namely, via the audit probability bi). Since
= ai + a
*







a (1 a ) b t
ak (1 ak) bkt
Thus, if a = ak, then b > bk => t
*
k >t




k . This is formally stated as the following corollary to Proposition 3.
Proposition 3A:
If there is no resource cost of tax evasion, if rate of tax evasion is same in all
industries and if the tax authority is utilitarian, then industries with higher audit
probabilities should have lower tax rates; alternatively, if the audit probability is the
same for all items, then industries with higher declaration (i.e. lower evasion) will
attract lower tax rates.
If the uncompensated cross price elasticities are very small, i.e. eki 0 for i ¹ k, so








Ei (Ai ˜ ai ti )
If we keep in mind that t
*
i will be optimal if l
t
i is invariant across commodities
(i = 1, ...., n), then (27) leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 4:
If the uncompensated cross price elasticities are very small, then the optimal












where (not indexed on i) is determined by a priori specified revenue constraint. ˜ f
Let us consider the case of the Rawlsian planner for whom only the poorest
individual matters i.e. . For such a planner, (27) implies w
1 1, w












(1 ˜ ak tk)




1denote the poorest individual’s consumption of k, .













1 ˜ ak ˜ a
stated in the form of the following Proposition:
Proposition 5:
If there is no resource cost of tax evasion, if the uncompensated cross price
elasticities are so small as to be negligible, if the tax evasion and audit probabilities
are identical across commodities, and if the expenditure distribution is such that the
ratio of aggregate to minimum consumption is the same for all items, then a
Rawlsian planner will consider a uniform tax rate policy to be an optimal one.
This range of conditions is unlikely to hold so that, in practice, the Rawlsian planner
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conventional case of no tax evasion and which underlies the tax reform exercises of
Ahmad and Stern (1984), Murty and Ray (1989) holds in the present case, if we15




change with ti. We demonstrate this below. Differentiating the r.h.s. of equation (23)
and using the first order condition for optimal ai [eqn. (9a)], we obtain after some














































Since the terms outside the square bracket are all individually positive, hence





























































Since the numerator on l.h.s. will always be greater than that on r.h.s., condition (31)



























Since Ai £ 1, condition (32) implies that if l
t
i is increasing in ti in the traditional case






words, tax evasion does not alter the qualitative nature of the relationship.
In the present context, there are three instruments at the disposal of the authorities -
the tax rates (t
*
i), the audit probabilities (bi) and fine (t). The principle underlying the
theory of marginal tax reform can be extended to a theory of "marginal audit
reform". Analogous to l
t
i, let us define as the marginal social cost of raising an l
b
i













The bi s need to be so altered as to move the s towards one another. If we recall l
b
i
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ak ak bk t eki tk Ek
di
(1 ai) t ti18









(36) implies that for , and provide a set of Î 0, Bi B, eki 0 k ¹i di 0
sufficient conditions for optimal audit probabilities to be uniform. This is stated in
the following proposition.
Proposition 6:
If the uncompensated cross price elasticities are so small as to be negligible, if the
cost of concealment function gi is such that the ratio of its first and second





are invariant to audit probabilities, then a Rawlsian planner will consider a uniform
audit probability scheme to be the optimal one.
The above proposition serves as a benchmark case for optimally uniform audit
probability and suggests that, in general, like for tax rates, a system of identical audit
probabilities will not be an optimal one. (36) shows the potential sensitivity of
directions of marginal audit reform to the welfare weights, the demand elasticities,
the tax-rates, and the slope of the audit cost function.
The preceeding discussion of marginal tax and audit reforms has been based on a
separate examination of the tax rates and audit probabilities. The directions of Pareto
improving reforms, in either case, point to a state of internal optimality where there
is no scope for improvement of either the tax structure or the audit probability







theories of marginal tax and audit reforms can, however, be extended to propose a
theory of marginal fiscal reform that recognises the dependence of the tax rates and
audit probabilities on one another via the common revenue constraint [eqn. (12)] that19
binds them both. The theory of marginal fiscal reform is based on the idea of
optimality of the tax and audit systems vis-a-vis one another, i.e.




i ,i 1, ..., n





tax rates and audit probabilities given by eqns. (24), (36) respectively, then for
optimality of a vector of tax rates and audit probabilities, we require
(38) Ei Bi Ai
di




















fi is the ratio of the m.r.s between ti, bi keeping social welfare constant to that
between them keeping total revenue constant. In optimality, fi = 1 for all i.
Now according as fi
<




(1 ai) t ti
i.e.
di
(1 ai) t ti
>
< Ei (Bi Ai)20
This, if we define , then Hi Ei(Bi Ai)>0






< (1 ai)t i H i
Equation (40) gives us the rule for marginal fiscal reform based on the third policy
instrument that has not been used so far, namely, the fine for evasion, t. If we make
them industry specific, ti, then the rule is as follows:
If , then raise ti (41a)
di
ti
>( 1a i )t i H i
If , then lower ti (41b)
di
ti
<( 1a i )t i H i
such that tends to
di
ti
(1 ai)t i H i
To sum up the discussion in this section, the sequence of steps in the marginal
reforms of taxes, audit probabilities and evasion penalties is as follows.
Step 1:
















Change the fines, ti, such that fi ® 1.
3. TAX REFORM RESULTS FOR INDIA
This section investigates the sensitivity of the rankings, which determine the l
t
i21
direction of marginal tax reforms, to the estimated demand system and to alternative
assumptions about commodity tax evasion. The estimated demand systems are LES
and its alternative generalizations, namely, the Non linear Generalized CES
(NGCES), and the QES due to Howe, Pollak and Wales (1979). NGCES is a new
two parameter generalization of the LES proposed and estimated in this paper.





















































k µ gk pk
2
Note that constitute the parameter sets of NGCES, QES {bi, gi, d, r}, {bi, g i,c i}
respectively. NGCES specializes to LES if and QES to LES if r 0, d 1 ci 0
for all i.
The uncompensated price elasticity formulae for these demand systems, in the base


























ci d ik bi ck
(45) 2b k c i b i c j 2g k c i b i
j
c j d ik
where dik is ’kronecker delta’.
The demand systems were estimated using the non linear maximum likelihood
procedure of SHAZAM on a 6 item disaggregation of household expenditure from a
time series of household budget surveys in India. These are collected by the National
Sample Survey Organisation and published as NSS Reports. The present study is
based on NSS 7th to 28 rounds (excluding the 26 th and 27 th rounds whose reports
were not available) covering the period from 1953-54 to 1973-74 - see Ray (1985)
for an analysis of the rural part of this data set using more complex demand systems.
For each round, estimates of average per capita expenditures for three groups of
population, namely, the poorest 30%, the middle 40% and the richest 30% have been
used. The six item disaggregation is as follows. (1) Cereals (2) Milk and Milk
Products (3) Other Food (4) Clothing (5) Fuel and light (6) Other Non Food.
The alternative sets of demand parameter estimates, along with their standard errors,
are presented in the Appendix. The parameters are generally well determined, and the23
estimates confirm significance of the LES generalizations. The aggregate
uncompensated price elasticities, which along with the tax rates and welfare weights
determine the , were calculated for the base year using formulae (44, 45). The l
t
i s
own price elasticities, presented in Table 1, exhibit considerable variation across
demand systems, especially for ’Other Food’ and ’Other Non Food’ groups of items.
To simplify the tax reform calculations, we set for alli-i nother words, ti 0.1
the indicate Pareto improving directions of marginal tax reform from an l
t
i s
assumed initial state of a uniform tax rate of 10% on each of the six groups of items.
We additionally require estimates of the resource cost of evasion function,gi (a )
[see eqns. (23, 23a)]. The following functional form for was carefully chosen gi (a )
to satisfy the priori features mentioned in Section 2. Note that gi (0) = 0 and gi (1) =
¥ for intuitive interpretation as suggested by Cremer and Gahvari (1993).


















Corresponding to the assumed values of and , (9a) with (47) gives us the ai ti
estimate of which, along with the social welfare weights and the estimated price bit
elasticities, determine the . l
t
i s
Tables 2, 3 provide evidence on the sensitivity of the rankings to a alternative l
t
i
demand systems, and b alternative assumptions on tax evasion. It is interesting to
note that, for a utilitarian tax authority, the rankings seem much more robust to l
t
i24
changes in specification. This contrasts with the ’optimal tax’ evidence for India
presented in Ray (1986) - see Decoster and Schokkart (1990, p. 295) for a
convincing explanation of this asymmetric result.25
4. TAX EVASION AND FISCAL FEDERALISM
The optimal taxation model underlying the theory of marginal reforms of taxes,
audits and penalties, outlined in Section 2, can be extended to include some of the
key elements of a federal nation. For analytical and notational simplicity, we consider
a federal nation with two provinces, and an individual residing in each province. The
specific tax paid on item i by the individual consists of qi which accrues to the
federal authority, and which accrues to province j that the individual resides in. t
j
i
Assuming the tax evasion and the evasion cost function gi(a
*) to be invariant to ai
the province where the product is sold, the producer’s expected profits per unit















where are the federal and provincial audit probabilities, the ˜ bi, b
j
i ˜ t, t
j
corresponding penalties for evasion, and is the share of item i that is sold in h
j
i

































Note that interior solution requires





























i (ai ai ˜ bi ˜ t), t
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aggregate consumption of i in the country. The federal and provincial audit costs, d,
are increasing functions of the corresponding audit probabilities . ( ˜ b, b
j
i)
Following Gordon (1983, p. 573)’s federal model of ‘fully coordinated decision
making’, optimal taxation and optimal audit scheme involve maximizing the social





The Lagrangean expression associated with this problem is
(52)








































































(54a) ˜ Ai 1
(1 ˜ bi ˜ t)g i ¢












Summing both sides of (53b) over j, subtracting from (53a) and re-arranging, we
obtain
(55)
1 ˜ bi ˜ t




















Re-arranging (55), we obtain an explicit expression for . This can be stated in ˜ bi ˜ t
the form of the following proposition.
Proposition 7:
In the centralized federal model with tax evasion, if commodity taxation is optimal,
then the federal instruments of deterrence can be expressed explicitly in ( ˜ bi,˜ t )





(56) ˜ bi ˜ t
1 ai ki (ai)





















(56) - (57) imply that if b
j t
j = bt, and , then . This can be l
j ˜ l bt ˜ b˜ t
formally stated in the form of the following proposition.
Proposition 8:
If the instruments for deterrence of tax evasion (b
j, t
j) are identical across the
provinces, and if the marginal social cost of raising an extra unit of revenue is the
same for each province and the federal authority, then the federal and provincial
audit probabilities and fines must coincide.





























We, thus, have the following proposition.29
Proposition 9:
In the centralized federal model of tax design with tax evasion, the federal and
provincial instruments must satisfy (58) and, in the special case of no tax evasion, so
that , the marginal social cost of federal revenue is a consumption ˜ Ai A
j
i 1
weighted average of the marginal social costs of provincial revenue.30
5. SIMULTANEOUS ANALYSIS OF COMMODITY AND INCOME TAX
EVASION
The commodity tax design model underlying the theory of marginal reforms under
tax evasion, outlined in Section 2, can be extended to include the design of income
tax in the presence of income tax evasion. We consider here only the case of a single
individual. The following framework, in the spirit of Dixit and Sandmo (1977) of
treating labour services as just another commodity, can provide a useful basis for
examining the issue of direct versus indirect taxes in presence of both forms of tax
evasion. The absence of such a framework probably explains the lack of numerical
evidence on the impact of tax evasion on the ’optimal mix’ of direct and indirect
taxes. Such evidence is of considerable value to the policy maker, especially in
developing countries.
The consumer maximizes his direct utility function U (x, ) defined over the




pi xi g (a )w w q
ew
where w is the gross wage rate, is the proportion of labour income a ( 1 a )
that is evaded or, alternatively, is the proportion of labour income that is declared a
to the tax authorities. is the resource cost of income concealment that is gi (ai)
increasing and convex in , and q
e, the ’expected’ tax rate on wage income (w ), a
is related to the actual tax rate (q) as follows.
(60) q
e (a a b t ) q
b is the audit probability of income tax declaration, and t the corresponding31
penalty for income tax evasion. A linear income tax scheme (i.e. constant marginal
tax rate) is being assumed for simplicity.
The consumer chooses x, , a so as to maximize u (x, ) subject to (59) and (60).
Assuming the consumer’s decision on work ( ) to be separable from that on how
much wage earnings to declare (a ) so that the latter does not enter u (), a is
chosen so as to maximize w
e , where the ’expected net wage rate’,
. The first order condition for optimal is given by w
e (1 q
e g)w a
(61) g (a ) (1 b t ) q
Interior solution requires
(61a) 1>b t
The government’s optimization problem involves maximization of the augmented







e w d( b ,b)
where the audit cost d is increasing in the bi s, b .




























where w is now the marginal utility of ’full income’, l is the Lagrangean constraint










If we denote the inverse of Ai , A by respectively, then these latter terms Ai ,A
can be interpreted as representing the impact of a unit change in expected tax rates
on consumer price (pi) and net expected wage rate (w




a change in commodity tax rate (ti) and income tax rate (q). Note that in the absence
of tax evasion, , and . Using (61) and, after some re- Ai Ai 1 A A 1
w











¢ a a b t33
Since the parameter is of some policy interest, it is useful to state the following A
implication of (65).
Proposition 10:
according as (66) A >
< 1








The first order conditions [eqns. (63a, b)] provide the estimating equations of the
optimal commodity and income tax rates. We can say virtually nothing about their
numerical magnitudes in the absence of complex calculations or a-priori assumptions.

























If we assume the cross price and cross wage responses to be negligible, i.e.
¶xi
¶pk

















































If we have, a-priori, numerical magnitudes on A , Ak, then (68) or (69) provides a
useful relation between optimal commodity and income taxes in the presence of tax
evasion.35
TABLE 1
Sensitivity of Own Price Elasticities to Demand System
Item LES NGCES QES
1. Cereals




5. Fuel and Light




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper focusses attention on the much neglected issue of commodity tax evasion
in the context of marginal tax reforms, and analyses some of the policy implications
from the consumers viewpoint in a many person economy. The empirical evidence
for India, which is purely illustrative, underlines the importance of the subject of this
paper by confirming sensitivity of the Pareto improving direction of tax changes to
the extent of commodity tax evasion in the economy. Much of the previous
discussion on tax evasion has been concerned with income tax evasion and the recent
papers, that do study commodity tax evasion, have mainly concentrated on the
production implications of such evasion. The theory of marginal tax reforms needs
modification to incorporate tax evasion before applying them in cases, especially the
developing countries, where commodity taxes and tax evasion are more important
than their direct counterpart. That is the chief motivation of this study. Moreover, the
paper extends the theory of reform of commodity taxes to embrace reform of audit
probabilities and penalty for evasion. We also derive several propositions that shed
some light on the issue.
We show that the analytical model of commodity tax evasion can be extended to
include income tax evasion, and provides a convenient framework for the
simultaneous analysis of both forms of evasion and study of their impact on the
"direct indirect" tax controversy. The numerical and analytical evidence of this paper
points to the importance of getting reliable estimates of commodity tax evasion since
this is a crucial determinant of tax reform. There is virtually no empirical study on
commodity tax evasion, especially in LDCs, where the problem is particularly
important. The paper makes a case for such studies. The subject of commodity tax
evasion deserves a good deal more attention than it has received to date.39
APPENDIX
a
Demand Parameter Estimates (standard errors in brackets)
LES NGCES QES































































































a k is number of ’free parameters’, and LL is Log Likelihood.40
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